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1When organisational effectiveness fails: business 
continuity management and the paradox of performance 
Introduction 
“Complexity is a defining characteristic of society and many of its 
technologies today. Yet simplicity and linearity remain the defining 
characterisitcs of the theories we use to explain bad events that emerge 
from this complexity” – (Dekker, 2011) p. 6. 
The management of organisational performance demands the attention of 
many stakeholders within organisations and across both public and provate 
sector organisations. As this Journal and others demonstrate, academic research 
on performance reflects both the variety and the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
issues around measuring and managing performance. Failures in organisational 
performance have also invariably attracted considerable attention due to the 
nature of a range of disruptive events.  High profile failures, ranging from 
catastrophic technical or service failures (recent examples include the failure of 
the London Ambulance Service computer system and the hacking attack on 
TalkTalk) through to the collapse of a number of financial institutions in the 
2008 banking crisis and the associated reputational failures, have been 
evaluated from a similarly broad, multi-disciplinary set of perspectives.  The 
multi-disciplinary crisis management literature seeks to speak to the causal 
factors for such catastrophic events, as well as evaluating the task demands 
associated with the operational crisis and the post-crisis recovery period 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smith, 1990, 1995). Much of that literature recognises 
the complexity referred to by Dekker in the opening quote and non-linear 
2behaviour within socio-technical systems is seen as a key element in shaping the 
ways that crises emerge.  Management practice – a key focus of this paper – 
typically addresses failures within systems in terms of poor organisational 
performance and effectiveness. Organisations seek to mitigate these risks by 
developing Business Continuity Management (BCM) 1 plans to allow managers to 
cope with the task demands of a crisis. BCM as a significant form of management 
practice, advocates that organisations should identify key strategic 
vulnerabilities, priorities, and their associated underpinning systems, processes 
and data, and ensure that the organisation has plans in place to manage, 
preserve and, in the event of a crisis, recover so that the business can continue 
without disruption (or with minimal disruption) (see, Mcilwee, 2013). 
As a management practice, BCM lays claim to be a holistic process that 
deals with a range of task demands generated by disturbances across the range 
of activities undertaken by the organisation.  The extent to which these BCM 
plans are effective also becomes part of the wider assessment of organisational 
performance and hence creates a potential paradox within organisations. BCM 
plans are often assumed to be able to deal with the task demands of failure, and 
yet they do so under a management culture that may have led to the failure in 
the first case. BCM also lays claims to be holistic in its scope – both in terms of its 
coverage across organisational functions and, by inference, across the range of 
disciplines that comprise ‘management’ within organisational settings.  There is 
also a paradox in that BCM could also be seen to be based on the rational, 
1 For the purposes of our present discussion, crisis management is seen as a broad-based process 
that deals with the pre- and post-crisis phases as well as the operational crisis. BCM is seen here 
as a more narrowly defined activity that is incorporated within crisis management. However, it 
should be noted that considerable debate exists around the exact meaning of the terms, 
especially as they relate to each other.  
3positivistic approach to management - that basically assumes that if you can 
measure it you can manage it – and yet it is seeking to deal with the demands 
generated by non-linear systems in a largely linear way. 
In reality, the practice of BCM can be seen to be somewhat narrower in its 
scope and may fail to fully address the holistic, complex and non-linear nature of 
organisational performance and failure. Despite this, its adoption and 
dissemination amongst the growing body of BCM practitioners and the emergent 
professional infrastructure that surrounds it would suggest that can offer more 
to organisations than it currently does at present.   If BCM could achieve its goal 
of being holistic in scope, then it would be in a position to change many of the 
command-and-control assumptions that exist across an organisation. At present, 
BCM, and to an extent the broader theories of crisis management, do not have a 
large-scale presence within business education and there are few specialised 
degrees in the area that would allow for the development of an appropriate skills 
set amongst managers (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2013, 2016). A 
first step in developing BCM as a core academic discipline within business 
education would require agreement about the parameters of the key terms used 
within the discipline and the development of a robust research agenda that 
strengthens the theoretical underpinnings of the subject. 
The aim of this paper is to consider how BCM is defined within the 
professional and academic communities that work in the area. As part of this 
assessment, the paper will set out the key elements that emerge from the 
definitions of BCM and consider how the various elements of BCM can interact 
with each other in the context of organisational performance. Of particular 
4concern here, is the manner in which vulnerabilities are embedded within 
organisational processes – a process described by Turner as ‘incubation’ – and 
this applies to the development of BCM strategies as well as the overall strategic 
direction of the organisation. The paper deals primarily with the complexities 
associated with managing these disturbances and the role that incubation can 
play in the various dimensions of BCM as a process. By way of illustration, the 
paper draws on the Talk Talk case to illustrate the challenges of BCM in practice. 
Although retaining a primary focus on the practice of BCM, the paper 
continually draws on the surrounding literatures on crisis management, safety, 
and security that provide additional insights into organisational responses to 
disturbances. The paper concludes by pointing to a range of considerations for 
academic research around the performance of BCM and the significance of recent 
work on crisis and safety science failure within that wider setting.  The starting 
point for this discussion is with the nature of the BCM process itself. The paper 
examines some of the key definitions of BCM in order to set out the main 
elements of the term. It then considers the challenges for BCM arising out of the 
TalkTalk hacking case before exploring the interactions between success and 
failure. 
Wither business continuity management? The search for meaning. 
The meanings given to key organisational constructs are important 
elements in the development of a shared understanding of the practicalities of 
the entity being described. These definitions impart meaning and also help in the 
development of processes around understanding and communication of BCM 
5issues within organisations. The issue of definition is not simply about the words 
used, but what is meant by the “underlying concepts” (Perneger, 2006). This is 
particularly important when those concepts are multi-dimensional and multi-
layered. These, definitions are important in helping us to provide meaning and 
efficient shortcuts – definitional schema if you like -  that allow us to make sense 
of the often abstracted mental structures that we hold about the world (Bartlett, 
1932). These schema are particularly important within the complex setting of 
organisations and especially when dealing with issues that are at the margins of 
our experience and understanding, such as those found under conditions of 
crisis. 
There are a range of definitions of BCM that are provided by both the 
academic and practitioner communities and which help set the parameters of the 
term and its practice-based limits. Ideally, these definitions should remove any 
ambiguities around the practicalities that might exist of what BCM means for 
managers in organisations and should serve to help frame the parameters of  the 
relationships between BCM and other aspects of organisational performance. 
The starting point for this discussion is with the British Standards 
Institution, which defines BCM by looking at it through the lens of the resilience 
construct (itself a potentially ambiguous term). It and frames BCM  as: 
“the ability of an organization to anticipate, prepare for, respond and 
adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions in order to survive 
and prosper. It reaches beyond risk management towards a more holistic 
view of business health and success.  A resilient organization is one that 
6not merely survives over the long term, but also flourishes - passing the 
test of time.” (British Standards Institution, 2016)2 
The key elements of this definition relate to the anticipation of disruptive events 
and the holistic approach that is taken to the preparation and implementation of 
strategies to deal with the threats that have been identified. It is not clear, for 
example, whether these disruptions include catastrophic events or low-
probability, high consequence hazards (often termed extreme events). The scale 
of any disruptive event can impact on an organisation’s absorptive capacity to 
deal with the task demands that it generates. Disruptions can be generated by 
both internal or external factors, both of which can expose pre-existing 
vulnerabilities within the organisation. The definition also sets out the 
relationships between these disruptions - it is worth noting that that the term 
crisis is not used here - and the success of the organisation. In some respects, this 
definition of BCM has much in common with the literatures relating to 
organisational agility and the development of dynamic capabilities, especially as 
they relate to processes around knowledge management (see, for example, 
Aitken, Christopher, & Towill, 2002; Becker, 2001; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  Resilience, which is seen as a key component of the 
process, is framed in terms of ongoing business success and longevity and so the 
temporal dimensions of BCM are incorporated into this definition. The definition 
does not see these disruptive events as being simply catastrophic but suggests 
that they may arise from a range of threats that may be sudden or incremental in 
their onset. 
2 http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/our-services/Organizational-Resilience/ 
7One of the striking elements of this definition is that it sees BCM as 
moving beyond conventional approaches to risk management towards a more 
holistic approach to the management of performance. An assumption here could 
be that risk management – with its emphasis on the aggregation of the risks of 
component failures, the focus on a priori evidence, and the determination of 
probabilities and consequences – may not be capable of dealing with issues in a 
holistic manner or with emergent forms of hazard. It may also prove problematic 
in those situations where the probabilities and consequences of an event are 
uncertain or indeterminate.  However, these constraints could also be seen to 
apply to business continuity approaches, especially given the diverse range of 
threats that an organisation may face. A second argument could be made that 
much organisational risk management activity is seen as being focussed on 
operational, rather than strategic, issues, although the growth in work around 
enterprise risk management (ERM) could be seen to contrast with such a 
criticism. (Beasley, Clune, & Hermanson, 2005; Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2009; 
O'Donnell, 2005). Whilst in theory, there is considerable potential for overlap 
between the processes of BCM and enterprise risk management, the focus within 
ERM on the processes of audit and accounting has led some to argue that it is too 
narrow a construct, and that the more holistic approach, such as that claimed 
within BCM, may prove to be preferable. Power, for example, argues that: 
“in the quirky and evolving world of BCM practice there is a nascent 
recognition that security is only possible as a collective activity. While this 
is far from being unproblematic, it contrasts with ERM, where we now 
know that security is at best limited to certain states of the world and at 
worst is illusory” - (Power, 2009), p.853. 
8This is dependent, of course, on BCM being able to develop the holistic and 
coherent approach to managing and responding to the risk matrix facing the 
organisation that it seeks to achieve. 
Much of the concern with ERM is around its focus on the auditable nature 
of the process. This could be seen as encouraging a more reductionist approach 
to identifying and managing threats rather than framing them in a more holistic 
way. Another issue here relates to the empirically-based nature of many risk 
assessment processes which do not easily lend themselves to dealing with those 
emergent forms of hazard for which there is no previous experience or for the 
actions of individuals who seek to cause harm. In these cases, the lack of a priori 
data about the threats could be seen to be a potentially inhibiting factor in terms 
of raising awareness of vulnerabilities. An approach that looks at vulnerabilities 
as well as threats, will require the development of an extensive knowledge-base 
in order to achieve this holistic approach.  Power also highlights the importance 
of the knowledge base that underpins both ERM and BCM.  This is a point that 
will be returned to later as it may prove to be a significant weakness in the 
current configuration of BCM in practice. 
Other definitions of BCM from the perspective of the professional bodies 
provide additional boundaries to the parameters of BCM. The UK’s Business 
Continuity Institute (BCI), for example, also defines BCM by reference to 
resilience and sees the process as being: 
“……about building and improving resilience in your business; it’s about 
identifying your key products and services and the most urgent activities 
that underpin them and then, once that ‘analysis’ is complete, it is about 
9devising plans and strategies that will enable you to continue your 
business operations and enable you to recover quickly and effectively 
from any type disruption [sic] whatever its size or cause. It gives you a 
solid framework to lean on in times of crisis and provides stability and 
security”. – (Business Continuity Institute)3 
Again, the key issue here is what is meant by resilience, as it can also been seen 
as an ambiguous term due to its development across different academic 
disciplines (Haimes, 2009; Hawley & DeHaan, 1996; Holling, 1973; Holling & 
Gunderson, 2002). 
Another key premise within the BCI definition relates to the development 
of a “sold framework to lean on in times of crisis” (op cit). Again there is 
potential for ambiguity here as it does not indicate whether that framework 
addresses all of the phases of a crisis (that is, pre-, post, and operational). The 
BCI definition also sees an effective plan as being able to deal with the task 
demands of a crisis irrespective of its scale. As scale, expressed in terms of 
consequences, is seen as a key element in shaping the capability of organisations 
to manage a crisis, then this scale-free proposition is a particularly challenging 
one. Other definitions, as we will see, do suggest that scale is a  factor in 
determining the performance of BCM. 
These issues highlight questions about the range of skills that would be 
required by BCM professionals in order to work at the holistic levels that the 
various definitions see as key to the process.  An important issue here is the way 
that BCM managers are trained and how this allows them to develop the skills 
3 http://www.thebci.org/index.php/resources/what-is-business-continuity 
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and capabilities needed to work across the organisation in a holistic manner. 
This discussion, whilst central to the issue of organisational performance, is 
outside of the scope of our present discussions, but is clearly an area where 
further discussion is needed in this journal. 
Moving away from a UK perspective, the US-based Disaster Recovery 
Institute has also sought to address the definitional issues by bringing together a 
number of the key terms used in an attempt to standardise the language used 
(DRI International, 2016). Within this context, they have adopted the definition 
of BCM that is used within the ISO standard 22301 in which BCM is seen as a: 
“Holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an 
organization and the impacts to business operations those threats, if 
realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organizational resilience with the capability of an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and 
value-creating activities” – (DRI International, 2016) 
The DRI goes on to provide further elaboration on the definition of BCM which 
strengthens further the link with resilience as a key element of the construct. 
Here BCM is seen as: 
“a management process that identifies risk, threats and vulnerabilities 
that could impact an entity's continued operations and provides a 
framework for building organizational resilience and the capability for an 
effective response. The objective of Business Continuity Management is to 
make the entity more resilient to potential threats and allow the entity to 
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resume or continue operations under adverse or abnormal conditions. 
This is accomplished by the introduction of appropriate resilience 
strategies to reduce the likelihood and impact of a threat and the 
development of plans to respond and recover from threats that cannot be 
controlled or mitigated” – (DRI International) 4. 
Although resilience forms a key part of these definitions of BCM, it is not 
clear which of the various perspectives on the resilience construct is seen to 
underpin the development of these strategies around BCM. The DRI Glossary 
defines resilience as: “the adaptive capacity of an organization in a complex and 
challenging environment” (p. 24) and qualifies this by reference to the ASIS/BSI 
standard in which the term is used to describe the organisation’s abilities to deal 
with the task demands of a disruption or return to an acceptable operational 
state within an appropriate time period. Again by reference to ASIS, the glossary 
defines resilience as: 
“the capacity of a system to maintain its functions and structure in the 
face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it 
must” (p. 24). 
This approach could be seen to have much in common with the engineering 
approaches to resilience, in which the defining characteristic is the ability of the 
entity to return to its prior equilibrium state after a disturbance. In some 
respects,  these definitions of BCM  might be seen to have introduced more 
ambiguity into the meaning of business continuity through its use of resilience as 
an underlying element of the definition. Some of the apparent contradictions 
4 https://www.drii.org/certification/professionalprac.php?lang=EN 
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within the definitions also add to this sense of greater ambiguity. On the one 
hand, some of the definitions see BCM as going beyond normal approaches to 
risk management (for example, the BSI definition) whilst others have a focus on 
the assessment of risk in what appears to be a fairly conventional way. 
Academic definitions of BCM also emphasise different elements of the 
process. An entry in the Encyclopaedia of Crisis Management, for example, sees 
BCM as “emergency planning for business” (p. 74). This introduces yet another 
concept, that of emergency, which has also proved to be difficult to define and is 
often framed within catastrophic events that usually involve mass casualties and 
which are managed by government agencies (Gross, 2008). In the Mcilwee 
definition, these events appear to be excluded from the BCM definition if they 
involve natural disasters that are so large as to require government involvement 
in the recovery period. The definition also seems to exclude those disturbances 
that result from a failure in governance aimed at protecting the organisation 
(Mcilwee, 2013). Exclusions such as these do little to add clarity to the 
parameters within which BCM operates. In terms of the practices that BCM 
undertakes, Mcilwee does provide greater clarity by setting out the concept of 
the BCM wheel that envisages six core steps in the development and 
maintenance of an effective BCM process (see Figure 1). 
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SOURCE: Based on Mcilwee (2013) 
The starting point here is with the programme management of BCM 
which is seen by Mcilwee as being an extension of project management (another 
functional discipline within the management area). Ideally, BCM should be 
overseen by a steering group that draws on the range of functional expertise that 
exists within the organisation (Mcilwee, 2013). However, Mcilwee does make an 
exception to that inclusive process. For some reason, he sees IT disaster recovery 
as being outside of the BCM process as it is considered to be a normal aspect of 
the IT function. Given the claims that BCM is a holistic process and given the 
centrality of information technologies in modern organisations, then such an 
omission seems to be somewhat contradictory. The determination of the scope 
of the BCM process is the second stage of the wheel. If key functional areas are 
omitted from any business impact analysis then it will inevitably constrain the 
development of the understanding process. Subsequent stages in the 
Figure 1 - the BCM wheel
14
development of the BCM strategy will invariably be inhibited by any gaps or 
weaknesses in the knowledge base that underpins the assessment of the threats 
and vulnerabilities facing the organisation. A robust business impact analysis can 
be seen to form part of an organisation’s protective structures but a partial 
assessment can serve to generate additional vulnerabilities. These protective 
structures are designed to help prevent complex systems from failing and are 
inevitably shaped by issues around knowledge management and information 
flows that affect the performance of relationships between functions and these 
protective structures (Dekker, 2011). The consequence is that the protective 
mechanisms put in place within the organisation, of which BCM could be seen as 
a key component, may themselves help to cause harm if they are based upon a 
set of flawed assumptions and information constraints. Notions of organisational 
limits are also important here in terms of shaping performance.  The focus on 
component failures in traditional approaches to dealing with hazards has been 
seen to ignore the connectivities and interdependencies that exist between those 
components (Leveson et al., 2005; Roberts, Madsen, & Desai, 2005). This would 
also apply to the interactions between the components of the BCM process 
shown in figure 1. We have already alluded to the problems associated with 
excluding some functional areas from the BCM programme, as this will impact on 
the understanding of the threats that the organisation faces as well as the 
performance of key functional areas and their interactions with other parts of 
the organisation. Any weakness in the early stages of the BCM wheel will 
inevitably impact on the subsequent stages, thereby incubating the potential for 
failure into the very protective structures that are designed to prevent such 
failures from occurring. 
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The holistic nature of the BCM process is also addressed in the definition 
provided by Hebane et al, who state that: 
“…business continuity management (BCM) has evolved into a process that 
identifies an organisation’s exposure to internal and external threats and 
synthesises hard and soft assets to provide effective prevention and 
recovery. Essential to the success of BCM is a thorough understanding of 
the wide range of threats (internal and external) and a recognition that an 
effective response will be determined by employees’ behaviour during the 
business recovery process” - (Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 2004), pp. 435-
436. 
There are several key elements of this description of BCM that are relevant to the 
discussion of organisational effectiveness. Firstly, there needs to be an effective 
process that addresses the identification of the threat matrix facing the 
organisation and, in an increasingly globalised environment, this needs to be 
carried out across the range of the company’s activities. These threats can arise 
from both internal and external sources and there may also be synergies between 
the various threat components that increases both the probability of failure and 
the consequences associated with it. This requires that those responsible for 
BCM develop an effective knowledge management programme that takes a wide 
perspective on organisation performance. Thus, knowledge management is a 
core activity that should be incorporated into the BCM wheel and should operate 
across the various elements in an explicit way. 
Secondly, any intervention processes and plans that are designed to 
prevent or mitigate potential threats also need to ensure that they do not 
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escalate the problem still further. Intervention strategies need to consider the 
connections between the functional elements of the system and should also 
reflect BCM’s role as part of the regulatory structures of the organisation. 
Ultimately, a failure in the project management process for BCM has the 
potential to incubate vulnerabilities into the organisation and move it into a state 
of crisis. The result is that the more complex the system is, the more the 
interactions between systems elements have the potential to generate emergent 
conditions which can lead to failure, despite each of the components working as 
designed (Hollnagel, 2012, 2014; Leveson, 2011; Perrow, 1984). 
Thirdly, both tangible and intangible assets need to be deployed within 
the BCM wheel to deal with the task demands generated by a disruptive event. 
The tangible assets may require the provision of new premises, alternative 
supply chain relationships, key infrastructural components, and critical human 
resources, all of which are expensive and difficult to source during a crisis event. 
The availability of key tangible assets required to deal with a potential crisis will 
impact upon organisational effectiveness and the planning for them will entail 
considerable cost, especially for an event that might not occur. The issues of 
effectiveness and efficiency are placed in a symbiotic relationship at the core of 
the business continuity process. Greater efficiencies may, ultimately, erode 
organisational effectiveness, especially when dealing with low-probability, high-
consequence events due to the cost of providing effective contingency 
arrangements for low-probability events. These extreme events highlight the 
challenge facing BCM in terms of the trade-offs that organisations make when 
planning for such hazards. One the one hand, the perceived view is that these are 
rare events and this has to be balanced against the potential harm that they may 
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generate if they do occur. Denying that such rare events can happen has been 
likened to a “Titanic syndrome” (Smith, 1993, 1995) in which the complacency 
generated by the event’s perceived low probability of occurrence serves to shape 
the conditions that ultimately allow the failure to occur. 
The effectiveness-efficiency paradox becomes even more problematic 
when considering the intangible assets that are involved in the BCM process. 
These intangible assets can include such attributes as trust, reputation, 
perceived capability, informal networks, and intellectual property. Any effective 
BCM process needs to map and develop protective strategies for these attributes 
as part of a robust strategic process and has to deal with the causes as well as the 
symptoms of organisational failure. It is important to note however, that these 
attributes may also be damaged by an ineffective BCM process and this may, in 
turn, serve to escalate the overall harm associated with the event. 
Finally, there is a clear view in the quote from Herbane et al that 
highlights the dependence of BCM on the performance of a range of actors within 
the organisation. The performance of these individuals and groups will be a 
function of the skills and attributes that have been developed to deal with the 
task requirements facing the organisation. These will include those tasks that 
exist in the organisation’s steady-state environment as well as those that lie 
outside of this designed-for state and will include a range of events that have the 
potential to generate a crisis. There is also an inherent paradox here as well. Why 
should we expect those managers who led the organisation into crisis to have the 
necessary skills and capabilities that are necessary to manage the organisation 
out of that crisis (Smith, 1990, 2000)? If we see a crisis as a set of exceptional 
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events, then there is an argument that it needs exceptional skills and capabilities 
to manage it. If, on the other hand, we see a crisis as arising out of the normal 
operating conditions within the organisation, then it raises a different set of 
challenges for organisations around the capabilities of all actors working within 
the wider system.  It is in this context that the notion of dynamic capabilities 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) can be seen to be important within the 
wider crisis management process. Whether BCM processes, as they are currently 
configured, provide these capabilities is a matter of some debate and the 
example of the TalkTalk hacking in 2015 serves to provide a brief illustration of 
some of the challenges associated with the task demands and practices of BCM. 
It’s good to talk – the TalkTalk crisis 
TalkTalk was attacked by hackers on the 21st October 2015 and this was 
the third security breach that the company had experienced during that year 
(Bisson, 2015). The company initially described the magnitude of the attack as 
involving elements of the personal data of up to 1.2 million of their customers 
and this material may have included some 21,000 bank account details (BBC 
News, 2015c). This figure was later revised down to 150,959 customers, 
including the bank account details of 15,656 customers (BBC News, 2015b). The 
confusion around the extent of the data breach was also matched by the 
apparent confusion within the company’s senior management team. During the 
crisis, the Chief Executive – Dido Harding – admitted on the BBC’s Today 
programme that she did not know the full extent of the problem and the 
company had therefore taken the decision to warn its 4 million customers that 
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their data may be at risk (Saunders, 2016). Such an honest and open approach is 
unusual in many crisis situations but if could be seen as commendable and a rare 
admission that senior managers were not in control of the complex socio-
technical systems that they operate.  Such apparent confusion in the early stages 
of the crisis is not an unusual phenomena and neither was the high degree of 
media scrutiny associate with it. However, what was more unusual, was that the 
company seemed not to understand the technical nature of the attack, despite 
being a well-established internet company (The Register, 2015).  The company 
also admitted that it had received a ransom demand from someone claiming to 
be the hacker (BBC News, 2015a).  There was also some speculation, following 
claims of responsibility made online, that the hack could have been carried out 
by an Islamist hacking group (Khomami, 2015; Withnall, 2015), although this 
was later found not to be the case. For an IT company,  issues around data 
security would be seen as quite fundamental to the nature of its core business 
and the confusion and ambiguity around the nature of the attack may have 
compounded the sense of crisis.  The fact that it was later found that the hack 
was carried out by a 17 year old who admitted in court to “showing off” to his 
friends (BBC news, 2016; Heathman, 2016) only added to the sense of crisis and 
the limitations of the company’s security controls. The result was that: 
“It quickly became apparent that neither Harding nor her fellow board 
members knew anything like as much as they should about the state of 
their data security – not only did they not know exactly what or how 
much data had been lost, or who had taken it, but there was even 
confusion over such basic questions as whether the lost details were 
encrypted” - (Saunders, 2016), p. 32. 
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 The outcome of the company’s response to the hack was that they were fined 
£400,000 by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) due to the 
apparent ease by which the attack was perpetrated (Information 
Commissioner's Office, 2016). Media reports stated that this was the largest fine 
to-date for a data protection breach and cited industry insiders who observed 
that: 
“the incident is only part of the story – the underlying breach is the failure 
to have appropriate measures in place. The hackers exploited a bug for 
which a fix existed. Not fixing a known problem is the definition of 
failuing to put appropriate measures in place” – Tim Turner (2040 
Training) (cited in Burgess, 2016a). 
In addition to the fine, TalkTalk lost somewhere in the order of 95,000 customers 
and accrued losses of £60 million, made up of a £15 million trading impact and 
the rest as exceptional costs (Burgess, 2016b). Despite the costs of the hack, the 
company’s overall revenue for the same quarter rose by 1.8% compared to the 
previous year (Burgess, 2016b). Dekker (2011) outlines a number of reasons 
why senior management may not have the level of control that is commonly 
perceived to exist. Firstly, uncertainty in a competitive and highly interconnected 
environment leads to local adaptations due to internal resource constraints as 
staff seek to achieve performance targets in a constrained context. Secondly, this 
drift away from an organisations designed-for-state takes place in small steps 
that go unnoticed and were the normalisation of deviations from established 
good practice can be made to ‘get the job done’. Thirdly, the decisions taken at 
various points in the organisational life-cycle can impact on conditions further 
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down the time-line (termed error cost by Collingridge (1992)). Fourthly, the 
processes by which organisational activities are regulated can contribute to this 
incubation of failure potential (see, Dekker, 2011). It is likely that each of these 
elements identified by Dekker may have played a role in the TalkTalk crisis. The 
legacy issues around the software vulnerability that appear not to have been 
acted upon by the company highlights the important of these elements and may 
also have contributed to the confusion within the company. 
The TalkTalk attack illustrates the need for organisations to take a more 
holistic approach to BCM and one that incorporates the importance of the 
incubation processes identified by a number of authors (Collingridge, 1992; 
Dekker, 2011; Reason, 1997; Turner, 1976).  It highlights the ways in which  the 
potential for failure can be incubated as a result of routine operating processes 
including:  the provision of information to senior managers about the risks that 
they face, the assumptions that they have around performance, the limitations of 
strength in-depth strategies, and the stove-piping that can take place between 
functional areas within the organisation (especially around security), and the 
impacts upon communication (Densham, 2015; McIntosh, 2015; Pace, 2016). 
The hack also highlights the role that such routine operational issues can have on 
the strategic performance of the organisation and their impacts on the 
generation of crisis. 
Against the background of the TalkTalk crisis, there are issues around 
how BCM can deal with the pre-crisis incubation issues that served to compound 
the problem, and especially around the apparent lack of strategic engagement in 
identifying vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities that were embedded within 
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TalkTalk’s operating procedures were exposed by the hack but were not clearly 
created as a function of that external attack. They resulted from internal 
decisions and processes along with the presence of legacy issues within the 
decision time-line.  The pre-crisis stage – termed a crisis of management (Smith, 
1990, 1995) – allows for vulnerabilities to be embedded in organisational 
routines and they arose out of issues relating to systems design and the 
generation of emergent conditions that invariably exist within complex socio-
technical systems. In addition, there are potential problems around the dominant 
mind-set that exists in organisations and which serves to shape the cultural 
paradigm through which decisions are taken (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).This 
initial phase of a crisis is also typified by constraints around the flows of 
information which arise from both structural and cultural elements within the 
organisation and which shape and constrain the information around early 
warnings and weak signals (Ansoff, 1975, 1980; Fischbacher-Smith & 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2014). 
If BCM and, perhaps to a more limited extent, crisis management, are not 
to be considered as the having a focus on the management of exceptions (Roux-
Dufort, 2007, 2009), then it will need to overcome these challenges around the 
processes of incubation and actively seek to address the ways in which success 
and failure interact together to generate crisis events. This will require a skills-
set that understands the holistic issues that face management and move away 
from a largely reactive approach to dealing with the threat matrix. In order to 
examine the nature of these challenges, it is first necessary to see how the 
various professional groupings that deal with BCM define the parameters of the 
term.  The definition of terms used to shape organisational behaviours are an 
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important aspect of helping to frame the nature of performance as they provide a 
benchmark against which performance criteria can be judged. Ambiguities in 
those definitions or in the key parameters of process activities, may well impair 
performance. 
Framing the parameters of business continuity 
The range of BCM definitions outlined earlier showed that there is a lack 
of agreement about the ways that business continuity is framed. Whilst there are 
areas of commonality within the definitions, there are also some elements that 
are potentially contradictory. The example of the TalkTalk hacking crisis 
illustrated how challenging managing such an event can be, although it is not 
clear that all of the definitions would have agreed that this was an issue for BCM 
to deal with rather than the IT department. Many of the vulnerabilities within 
TalkTalk seem to have been embedded in the organisation prior to the event. 
The paper now seeks to bring together the key elements of BCM that emerge out 
of the definitions and to add additional elements that were highlighted in 
cognate literatures and from the TalkTalk case. Inevitably, this will not be a 
definitive exposition of the elements of BCM but, instead, is an attempt to 
highlight the common ground issues and those elements that need to be 
incorporated into the BCM agenda in order to allow it to achieve its holistic goals 
around hazard management. 
One of the notable issues within all of the definitions of BCM relate to the 
key managerial process that are seen as being essential in allowing it to develop 
of a holistic approach. The specifics of these processes are not developed in 
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detail within the definitions but they are essential to the performance of BCM in 
practice. Figure 2 highlights the key elements drawn from these definitions, 
along with a number of additional elements that could be seen as important in 
supporting the BCM wheel. These include: 
• The importance of emergent conditions in generating additional and
unforeseen task demands for the organisation and which may allow 
events to exceed the limits of any contingency arrangements put in 
place within the organisation (Smith, 2000; Smith, 2005) 
• The role played by extreme events in generating a unique set of
circumstances for which the organisation has no contingency plans in 
place. 
• Knowledge management and its dissemination,
• An understanding of the processes by which failures are incubated and
how those processes relate to success, 
• The development of dynamic capabilities amongst key actors in the
system (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997), 
• The provision of effective management training in order to overcome
the challenges that are generated by a holistic approach. This would be 
a first step in avoiding the problems of weak management which has 
been seen as a factor in the generation of crisis (Turner, 1994). This is 
framed here within the context of the Chartered Management Institutes 
notion of the ‘Accidental Manager’ syndrome – those individuals who 
hold managerial roles but without any formal training. 
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Figure 2 – Elements of BCM as practice 
There are several challenges that arise out of the landscape of issues 
highlighted in Figure 2. The first of these relates to the skills requirements 
needed to work across the main elements incorporated into the definitions of 
BCM. By way of illustration, we can take the challenges presented by the 
‘analytical diamond’ of issues that sits at the core of the threat matrix shown in 
Figure 2. Developing an understanding of the range of threats that an 
organisation faces is challenging in itself, but especially so considering the 
additional vulnerabilities that exist across the range of organisational processes 
and procedures in each of the functional areas. The skills needed to work across 
the portfolio of threats facing an organisation is considerable. To be effective, 
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those involved in BCM would need to have both managerial and technical 
competencies in order to deliver on the holistic claims set out in the definitions. 
A second area where BCM might run into difficulties relates to the 
relationships with existing processes around risk management. The British 
Standards definition states that BCM can go beyond risk management by being 
more holistic – an argument that Power (2009) is also sympathetic to – but no 
indication is provided as to how BCM will adopt the strategic approach that 
would be needed to make this work or how it would ensure that business 
continuity issues are firmly placed on the board’s agenda. The DRI definition, on 
the other hand, sees BCM as a process that allows for the identification of “risks, 
threats and vulnerabilities” but this could be seen as falling within the existing 
remit of risk management approaches (including ERM), and it isn’t clear how 
BCM will differentiate itself from other cognate areas in this space. 
Thirdly, each of the definitions makes reference to resilience as an 
outcome of the BCM process but none of the definitions acknowledge that 
resilience can also be a contested term. ‘Resilience’ has a range of different 
meanings across the main bodies of work that use the term and these include: 
• engineering: where resilience is often framed in terms of the ability of the
system to ‘bounce back’ from a shock event; 
• education and counselling: where the importance of networks and support
structures provides the necessary social relationships that are needed to 
deal with the task demands of a shock event; 
• systems biology: where resilience is often framed in terms of the fitness of
organisms (and organisations) to operate across different environmental 
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settings. In some respects, this has synergies with the notion of dynamic 
capabilities within an organisational setting. 
So the notion of “building and improving resilience” referred to in the definition 
of BCM could well be seen as a fractured, if not a contested, space within which 
an understanding of the main elements of the term might prove to be difficult. 
For the purposes of our present discussions, the key elements here are the 
anticipatory and sustainability aspects of the resilience process. However, there 
is an argument to suggest that they are also key aspects of the main theoretical 
perspectives on crisis management. 
Finally, there is the issue of defining the parameters of BCM. The DRI 
frames BCM as an umbrella term that has the potential to bring together and 
integrate the processes of: the continuity of organisational activities (through the 
relocation of activities after a disturbance), disaster recovery (framed in terms of 
IT recovery), emergency response (as the protection of life), and crisis 
management (expressed in terms of business protection)5.  Each of these terms 
would, however, also be subject to definitional disputes that make the 
standardisation of terms problematic. For example, the term disaster has been 
explored in some detail within the academic literature (Quarantelli, 1978a, b, 
1998a, b) and there is a view that sees a disaster as having a geo-physical core 
(Stallings, 2004), thereby excluding socio-technical systems. Within the 
computing area - a classic socio-technical system – a disaster is normally seen as 
relating to the failure of an IT system and the disaster recovery process is 
concerned with the response to a catastrophic failure of that system. So, despite 
5 https://www.drii.org/whatisbcm.php 
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seeking to standardise the nature of definitions relating to BCM, some of the 
professional groupings that represent work in this area (and who also certify 
practitioners) are adding to the proliferation of ‘definitions’ without necessarily 
addressing some of the contradictions that exist within them.  There are 
therefore some significant issues around the definitions used in practice to 
describe BCM, its relationships with other key activities and constructs (and 
their associated bodies of work), and the ways in which the definitions that are 
used can serve to shape practice. 
The challenges here relate to the strategic requirements that an effective 
BCM process generates. Like corporate security, BCM is often not directly 
represented on the board of many organisations. The TalkTalk example 
highlights the problems that the lack of board awareness across both of these 
functional areas can generate. There is also the issue of the core skills that a BC 
manager would have relative to other senior officers within an organisation. 
Many of the board level functions are represented by well-established 
professional bodies – often with Chartered status – and many of these disciplines 
have a clear strategic focus. Areas such as management, marketing, finance and 
HRM are also all represented within the core curriculum of MBA programmes 
and each of them would claim to have a clear strategic focus. As such, they aim to 
provide a more holistic approach to dealing with the demands facing the 
organisation. At present, it is not clear that BCM is able to achieve this reach and 
significance within organisations and it is certainly not represented in the core 
curricula of business schools to the level that is required (Fischbacher-Smith & 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2013, 2016). 
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BCM should be seen as a multi-level process that has the potential to 
integrate both strategic and operational activities, is dependent upon tangible 
and intangible assets, and is a function of the skills, knowledge and capabilities 
that are held by actors within the organisation. All of these elements are dynamic 
and require adaptive responses in order to cope with an ever-changing treat 
environment that can impact upon organisational performance across space and 
time. There is also a synergy between the attributes and process of an 
organisation operating in a steady-state environment and which may impact 
upon performance as the environment changes. Turner (1976, 1978) framed 
these processes as akin to the incubation of a virus within the organisation in 
which the development of the problem remains undetected until its symptoms 
manifest themselves, often at the point of failure. The decisions and actions taken 
at various points in space and time, will impact (negatively or positively) on 
performance further down the timeline. An effective approach to BCM should 
seek to identify these early warnings and weak signals and do so from a strategic 
perspective. 
If effectiveness and efficiency can interact together to determine 
organisational performance, then it follows that those interactions can have both 
positive and negative effects. These effects can impact both on the processes that 
generate the pre-conditions for crisis and may also inhibit the effectiveness of 
those business continuity processes that are designed to deal with that crisis 
should it occur. If, for example, an organisation is capable of incubating the 
potential for failure within its own processes and practices (Reason, 1990, 1997; 
Turner, 1976, 1978, 1994), then it may well also incubate the potential for 
failure within its contingency planning processes. 
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The boundaries between BCM and other functional areas within 
organisations are invariably fluid and multi-faceted. They are also dependent on 
the relationships that exist between the system-as-designed and its emergent 
state – that is, as a function of both the changes in the operating environment 
and the adaptations that are made to deal with these task demands. As a 
consequence, the distinction between success and failure within an organisation 
is often blurred, spatially and temporally constrained, and may be a function of 
the decisions taken over time that reflected a different set of task demands to 
those currently experienced. Inevitably, managers will have an incomplete 
understanding of the nature of these interactions and, as such, will struggle to 
understand the operating conditions of the system as it fluctuates and 
approaches its limits. If crisis management and BCM are to move beyond a 
situation were they are perceived as dealing with exceptional events, then it is 
necessary for the theories and practices associated with them to develop a more 
nuanced view about the relationships between success and failure. 
If we frame failure – of which crisis is perhaps an extreme example – as an 
exceptional event then we fail to see how the routine, ‘normal’ ways of working 
within organisations generate the pre-conditions for failure. The practice of 
business continuity management should sit at the core of many of the debates 
around organisational effectiveness and performance. It represents the 
symbiotic nature of success and failure and it highlights the problems that 
organisational cultures can generate in terms of the incubation of failure 
potential, both in terms of the routine activities of the organisation and the 
preparation of contingency plans for exceptional conditions.  As it currently 
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stands, BCM needs to draw more on the theoretical perspective offered by crisis 
management research. 
Crisis management can be seen to have a focus on the addressing the pre-
conditions of a crisis as well as the operational stage of the event (Smith, 1990). 
The early work of Turner (1976, 1978, 1994), for example, highlighted the 
importance of assessing those processes by which the potential for failure could 
be incubated. This was built upon by Perrow (1984) in describing the generation 
of normal accidents and Reason though the construct of latent conditions (1990, 
1997). If, as this and subsequent work suggests, that crisis management is not 
just concerned with the control of exceptional events (Roux-Dufort, 2009; Roux-
Dufort & Lalonde, 2013) but also recognises the importance of day-to-day 
activities within the organisation (Hollnagel, 2014), then any effective crisis or 
BCM approach should be seen as a core element of the management of the 
organisation.   Ultimately, this requires BCM to be an inherently strategic and 
holistic process that integrates together a number of key organisational 
processes around human resource management, knowledge management, 
organisational learning, communication, and strategy. This would require BCM 
training to be a part of the core management development of staff within the 
organisation, thereby integrating BCM into the  operational and strategic fabric 
of  the organisation. In order to achieve that goal, it will require changes in the 
ways that managers are trained (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2016) 
and would lead to crisis management being a core element of management 
programmes such as the MBA (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-Smith, 2013). 
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Conclusions 
“Crisis management is perceived as the management of exceptional or 
out-of-the-ordinary situations, but it does very little to help theorize the 
functioning of organizations. One of the reasons why organization 
theorists have shown little interest in theorizing the concept of crisis is 
that this concept fosters paradoxical attitudes” - (Roux-Dufort, 2007), pp. 
105-106. 
The relationships between organisational performance and the 
generation of crises can be seen to be paradoxical at a number of ways. Firstly, as 
Dekker observes, we work in complex, non-linear settings and yet we often seek 
to manage that complexity with simplicity and linear thinking. This paradox has 
long been recognised within the academic literature on systems (Ashby, 1947; 
Ashby, 1964; de Raadt, 1987) but organisations appear content to persist in 
developing control mechanisms that assume linearity around cause and effect 
relationships. Secondly, we position notions of crisis and failure as opposite 
systems states from success and high performance. Recent work has suggested, 
however, that such a binary view is problematic and that success and failure are 
symbiotic in many respects (Dekker, 2011; Hollnagel, 2014; Leveson, 2004). 
Thirdly, we see crisis as an inhibitor of organisational performance when in 
many respects the search for performance, and the associated strategy of 
management by metric, may contribute to the incubation of crisis potential. 
Finally, there is often a gap between the perceptions that managers have about 
the way in which the system works (its designed for state) relative to the way 
that it functions in practice (its emergent state). The gap between these two 
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systems states is a function of shifts in the environment that have required 
changes in the system at the local level in order to maintain performance levels. 
These adaptations often go unrecorded and senior management are often 
unaware that such changes have taken place (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-
Smith, 2014). 
This paper has sought to consider the nature of the BCM process and 
frame it within the context of organisational effectiveness. Both the practice and 
research based literatures acknowledge that in order to be effective, BCM must 
adopt a holistic approach to dealing with the issues that face organisations. 
Unlike many other aspects of organisational activity, BCM as a process has its 
own redundancy as a core aim – that is, organisations hope never to have to 
deploy their BC strategies but if they do then they have to be effective. The 
increasing scale and complexity of organisations and the geographical scale over 
which they operate, have the potential to generate emergent conditions that will 
have the potential to generate crises. More recent work in the risk and safety 
fields has pointed to the fact that failures can occur event when there are no 
failures at the component level and that problems can be generated within the 
spaces of interaction between components that can move an organisation into an 
unstable state. This is the inherent paradox that sits at the core of the BCM 
process and its relationships with organisational performance. As long as BCM 
and crisis management are seen as issues of exception within the management 
process then the challenges around organisational failures will continue to be an 
issue for managers to address. As long as mainstream management research sees 
these issues as peripheral to organisational theory then the BCM area will be 
starved of theoretical  insights into the ways in which complex systems fail.  As a 
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consequence, the paradoxical nature of the relationships between organisational 
performance and crisis will continue. 
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